Word and Object

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Wittgenstein

Deconstructing Wittgenstein

March 19th, 2008 · No Comments

§243 – §315 of the Philosophical Investigations suggest a large quantity of imprecise notions, which is typical of Wittgenstein. I don’t want to call them “concepts” or “ideas,” and certainly not “propositions.” The definitions of each of these words is different, and they imply other contexts. “Proposals” might work, but that makes it sound as […]

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Wittgenstein’s Sensations

December 4th, 2007 · No Comments

At §290 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein avers I do not “identify my sensation by criteria.” I would need a set of function predicates in order to do so, i.e. the sensation is x only if f (x) is true; in other words, f properly can be attributed of (or to) x. One way to […]

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Wittgenstein on “Knowing That,” “Knowing How” and “Being Able to Do”

November 9th, 2007 · No Comments

At §150 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein invites us to consider three separate concepts: 1. {“knowing that”}; 2. {“knowing how”}; and 3. {“being able to do”}. Wittgenstein states their “grammar” is “evidently closely related.” Wittgenstein has a propensity to put forth “stalking horses” as a way to delineate his position more sharply. And, frequently, he […]

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